Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to

have this opportunity to testify before the Committee on Foreign

Relations in my capacity as U.S. Coordinator for the Future of Afghanistan.

In the interest of time, what I suggest is I simply summarize

my prepared remarks and we can put the longer statement, if you would like, in the record.

Our aims in Afghanistan are well known.

We seek an Afghanistan that is free of terrorists, that no longer is

a source of poppy, and that allows its citizens to return home and

live normal lives in which opportunity comes to replace misery.

Today we can all take considerable satisfaction in how much

progress we have made toward the realization of these goals. I say

this fully aware of all that remains to be done.

Moreover, it is difficult to exaggerate the difficulties still before

us. Still, Mr. Chairman, I view the future with some confidence.

This stems first and foremost from the great success of the coalition’s military operations.

The second reason for guarded optimism is the behavior of the

Afghans themselves. What we have witnessed recently could not be

more different from what took place when the Mujaheddin defeated

the Soviets in 1989. Today Northern Alliance soldiers are acting

with discipline. Reprisals and atrocities appear to be notably absent.

Moreover, we have seen at Bonn a remarkable demonstration

of Afghans coming together to forge a common political future.

The third reason for my relatively upbeat assessment today is

the behavior of Afghanistan’s neighbors and others with influence.

Countries appear to understand that restraint is necessary if a stable

Afghanistan will materialize. We are seeing less of the historic

‘‘great game’’ and more cooperation for the greater good.

The fourth and final reason for my optimism today is the attitude

of the international community. In 1989, in the wake of the

Soviet military withdrawal, much of the international community

decided to limit their involvement in Afghanistan out of respect for

the strong Afghan tradition of independence from foreigners. This

time around, the help will be there.

Future success, though, will depend on translating this potential

situation into actual accomplishments. As you have just heard, Assistant

Secretary Rocca focused on the political and diplomatic and

humanitarian questions. What I would like to do is turn to questions

of reconstruction and security.

Beginning with reconstruction, the challenge is to move as expeditiously

as possible along the humanitarian continuum from relief

and recovery to actual reconstruction projects. Already, a number

of international meetings have been convened toward these ends

and a conference at which donors will pledge assistance is to gather in Tokyo in January.

These meetings will take place under the co-chairmanship of a

steering committee consisting of the United States, Japan, the European

Union, and Saudi Arabia. The nature and scale of the effort

will be determined not simply by the generosity of the donor countries,

but also by Afghanistan’s needs and its absorptive capacity.

The necessary detailed asssessments are being conducted right now

by the U.N. Development Program, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank.

Although the planning for Afghanistan’s recovery and reconstruction

is necessarily in its early stages, a good many of the principles

which will inform it can already be articulated. First, the effort will

be comprehensive, ranging from so-called quick impact projects to

longer term and larger undertakings. In this, resettlement of refugees

and the internally displaced will be an ongoing priority.

Second, a second priority will be to discourage the production of

poppy. This will likely require a focus on alternative economic development

as well as eradication and border control.

Another priority, one already mentioned by my colleague, will be

improving the situation of and prospects for girls and women. To

deny them a role, a significant role, in Afghanistan’s future would

be equivalent to drawing a line down the middle of the country and

simply ignoring all the people on one side of that line.

Recovery and reconstruction must be done with, not to, the Afghans.

This requires involving women in the planning and develop-

ment of the project, involving the Afghan diaspora, and involving

elements of civil society who have remained in the country.

Reconstruction needs to be an Afghan mainly, but not an Afghan

only, endeavor. Afghanistan’s neighbors are more likely to support

and cooperate with international efforts to promote Afghanistan’s

stability if they participate in and benefit from the process.

Last, recovery and reconstruction will require a sustained, generous

effort by the international community. We are clearly looking

at a total of many billions of dollars over many years. It is both

right and necessary that the United States be prepared to do its

share. The administration looks forward to consulting with this

committee and with the Congress as our planning on the scope and

scale of what we do becomes more refined.

Let me turn now to the military and security front. The immediate

challenge is to continue to prosecute the war successfully

against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Again, this is something that

will be accomplished by the U.S.-led coalition together with Afghans themselves.

Let me turn now more specifically to security arrangements. The

agreement just signed in Bonn calls for an international security

force to help Afghans provide near-term security in Kabul and the

surrounding areas. The signatories to the agreement also ask the

international community to help train a pan-Afghan security force.

There are, though, a number of questions still to be determined

about an international security force, including its mandate, its

size, its capability, its composition, command arrangements, and

the precise area of deployment. These and related issues are being

discussed among U.S. officials, the Afghan Interim Authority once

it is formed, the United Nations, and potential troop contributors.

One thing, though, is critical. Such a force must do nothing that

would in any way inhibit the coalition from carrying out the primary

objectives of ridding Afghanistan of terror.

Mr. Chairman, let me end my remarks with just a few principles.

First, despite the optimism that you have heard, we do not harbor

unrealistic goals of perfection for Afghanistan. But we do believe it

is both desirable and necessary to work with Afghans and others

in the international community to make Afghanistan viable.

Second, the role of the international community is and will remain

critical, yet it must remain limited. This is not Cambodia, it

is not East Timor. Afghanistan is not to be a U.N. or international

trusteeship. Many of the details of the future of Afghan society,

economy, and its political system must be devised and implemented

by Afghans themselves. They will have the principal and final say

about how to blend the traditional and the modern, the central and

the local, the national and the tribal.

Third, we need to be clear about our time horizons. The U.S.-coalition

effort will not be ended until its mission is complete. Then,

however, coalition forces will be prepared to depart. This is as it

should be. But we should not be thinking about exit strategies

when it comes to assisting the Afghans with their political, economic,

and security challenges. An engagement strategy is what is needed.

Fourth, we need to be prepared for tactical setbacks. Attacks by

individuals or small groups of terrorists or Taliban sympathizers

could continue for months or even years. Some disagreement and

even infighting among the Afghans themselves is to be expected.

Not everyone is going to endorse the emerging order. Eradicating

drugs will be an ongoing challenge, as will persuading Afghans to

give up their arms. Yet, these and other challenges should not preclude

what has the potential to be a strategic trajectory of progress.

Last, it is important we keep in mind just why it is we are involved

in Afghanistan. We want and need to succeed because we

do not want to contemplate having again to deal with the consequences

of a failed pariah country. At the same time, history and

conscience argue for doing a great deal to give the people of Afghanistan

a new lease on life. What we have now is a historical

rarity, a second chance to do right by ourselves and by others.

American foreign policy at its best combines the strategic and the

moral. Afghanistan is an opportunity to demonstrate just this.

Thank you and I look forward to your questions and comments.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have been

weighing a lot of these same tradeoffs ourselves, as you might expect,

over the past few months. One of the key things in the timing,

in addition to obviously having the military situation reach a

point where you could even contemplate a role for an international

security force, was also having an Interim Authority to work with.

We needed a representative, legitimate Afghan partner to discuss

this, and that will be in place, we expect, by December 22. Indeed,

we needed something like Bonn to actually produce someone to talk

to in the intervening period.

The general options are as you suggest. A blue-helmeted force

seems out of the question for the foreseeable future. Blue-helmeted

forces are there for peacekeeping. At the moment there is no peace to keep.

than a traditional peacekeeping force here. I think we have to be

realistic. But again, how much more and where I think are important

questions. I think there is a spectrum here, that we have to

be careful about where it is we feel comfortable with ourselves

going and where we want to put certain limits.

But I think again everyone understands that this is not appropriate

for a traditional U.N. blue-helmeted force, which tends to

work in a consensual environment, usually has very little capability,

and so forth. Everyone understands that is not called for.

An indigenous force, a so-called pan-Afghan force, is envisioned

by the Bonn agreement. It is everyone’s goal ultimately. The problem

is we just cannot get from here to there as quickly as we would

like to. You simply do not have the political basis and the coalition and the experience.

So what we therefore need is a gap-filler essentially between

where we are now and when a pan-Afghan force could assume the

role of security in Afghanistan. I think there you are looking at

some sort of an international security force, as it is called in the

Bonn agreement. It is endorsed by the United Nations, but it does

not report to the United Nations, an important distinction.

We obviously have to work out questions of command arrangements,

coming back to the first principle that nothing it does could

in any way hobble or interfere with the operations of the coalition.

We have got to still look at questions of its geographic coverage,

whether it is simply limited to Kabul or it goes beyond. There is

obviously questions of composition. I take your point that it will

need some capable questions.

But these are exactly the questions we are wrestling with. These

are not unilateral for us to decide. It is something that we are

working out with potential troop contributors, with the United Nations,

and with the Afghans themselves, because if you read the

Bonn agreement carefully, if this force came into Kabul it would be

preceded by the withdrawal from Kabul of all Afghan forces. So

this is very much a friendly, if you will, transition from the existing

situation to something else.

I am sorry?

You are asking, Senator, one of the most

basic questions and it is something I come out I suppose with

guarded optimism. Depending on the day, I either emphasize the

word ‘‘guarded’’ or I emphasize the word ‘‘optimism.’’ I am not

going to stand up here or sit here and be a Pollyanna and say it

is going to be smooth sailing. It is not.

But the reasons that I do have some optimism is that I do see

the Afghans themselves showing that they have learned from their

mistakes of the past. The fact that something like Bonn could happen

is in itself an accomplishment. The fact that we have not seen

the sort of reprisals in cities that are liberated that we saw in the

early nineties I think shows some progress. The fact that the

neighboring countries and others who have significant influence essentially

worked behind the scenes at Bonn to make it happen at

least suggests that they understand that if they try to get maximal

influence for themselves everyone else is going to do the same and

no one is going to benefit.

The fact that the international community is willing to put lots

of resources this time around and not walk away, as you yourself

referred to in your statement. So again, I am not going to predict

an easy road. I am not even going to predict success. But I do think

there are some reasons to think that there is probably the best

chance in modern history to set Afghanistan on a relatively stable

and successful path that you or I have ever seen. That, as a policymaker,

it gives us something to work with and it obviously gives

us, I think, a challenge that is not so ambitious that it is simply unrealistic.

Sir, I do not believe a U.N. force, if you mean a force that reports to the

United Nations, is desirable. I do think, though, we will need an international security force.

Pardon me?

I think we need some capable countries,

some serious countries. We are looking at them. It could be several

countries in Europe. Members of NATO have expressed an interest

or a willingness in participating or even leading such a force. Several

Arab or Islamic countries could also be a part of such a force.

It would have to be done in a way, again, that no way would

interfere with what General Franks and the coalition are doing. It

could possibly even report to the coalition so you did not have a

separate line of command arrangements, something you said. I

think any such force has to go in with its eyes wide open. Afghanistan

is probably going to suffer from a significant degree of lawlessness,

as well as pockets of foreign Taliban and al-Qaeda resistance,

for some time to come. So any such force needs to have the capability

so it can more than hold its own in that kind of a stressful environment.

Senator, on the question of security, if you

read the Bonn agreement, the annex that is devoted to the international

security force, I think the first sentence is relevant here.

Let me just quote it: ‘‘The participants in the U.N. talks on Afghanistan

recognize that the responsibility for providing security and

law and order throughout the country resides with the Afghans themselves.’’ That is key.

If there is an international security force, again I think you are

looking at it either possibly just in Kabul, conceivably it might go

to one or two other population centers. But we are not talking

about occupying Afghanistan. We have got a country here the size

of Texas and that sort of occupation is a recipe for trouble. It would

not do the international security force or the Afghans any good.

The bulk of the security has to come from essentially Afghan

forces reporting to the central government as part of this new national

army that is going to be built. As Christina said in her testimony,

this is one of the ways in which there is going to have to

be a balance between what is done at the capital and what is done

in a decentralized fashion around the rest of the country.

But there is no way that an international security force can provide

point defense for every aid convoy or every international worker

in every square inch of Afghan territory. That would simply

spread it too thin. That is where training the Afghans and hopefully

getting them up to a level of professional competence has a

real potential to make a difference. That is also where consent in

Afghanistan is going to make a difference. We are hoping that the

Afghan forces are not challenged to a degree where lawlessness becomes

the rule rather than the exception.

Just very quickly on the reconstruction area, the numbers are

necessarily vague about the scale of the effort. People are throwing

around a lot of numbers. I would not put a whole lot of stock in

them yet. Until you do a serious needs assessment, until you really

look at the question of sequencing, of absorptive capacity and so

forth, I do not think the numbers are terribly meaningful and specific,

though you are essentially right, we are talking about a large

amount of money over multiple years.

The United States will do its share. What exactly that share is

is obviously going to depend upon the whole, and we are just not

at the point yet where we are prepared to say this many dollars

in this package of legislation. But it is something that we are beginning

to refine and it is something we will do with the Congress as we get farther along.

I think we do. There is a dilemma here. It

is the typical Goldilocks case. We want to do enough, but not too

much. We want to do enough to basically realize our goals in Afghanistan,

to put it crudely, so we do not have to do what we have

just done again in several years. On the other hand, we do not

want to get involved in the sort of intrusive nation-building which

would be resented by Afghans or resisted by them ultimately, and

we should not get involved in activities to the exclusion of other

members of the international community.

For example, the reconstruction effort; it should not be a mostly

U.S. effort. There is every good reason in the world why the bulk

of the resources ought to come from other countries. The United

States has clearly carried out the bulk of the coalition effort. In

that phase, the United States has done the lion’s share of the world’s work.

I would see us staying involved politically and diplomatically,

supporting the efforts of Lochdar Brahimi, the Secretary General’s

Special Representative, doing what we can do in various fora,

working with the six immediate neighbors of Afghanistan, working

with the Russians, the Indians, and others with influence to try to

create a context in which we can hopefully mute the internal competition and jockeying.

On the question of a security force, again I think the bulk of the

contributors will come from capable countries on the outside.

Again, several European countries have indicated their willingness

to do that. The United States will consider taking on a modest role

to help enable such a force, to facilitate it.

Maybe it is a question of language, but we

have been accused of many things here and indirectness is not normally

one of them. On the other hand, though, we do not want to

make this an American enterprise, because it is not. It is first of

all for the Afghans themselves. Second of all, the U.N. has a key

role, as you know. Third, the six neighbors have a key role, as do

some other countries which have historical involvement there.

The United States is doing an enormous lot. As Christina mentioned,

we have taken the lead on the humanitarian side. We have

obviously done the lead on the coalition effort, military effort

against al-Qaeda and against the Taliban. We are one of the cochairs

of the reconstruction effort and will contribute to that generously,

I would expect. We were one of the prime movers behind the

success at Bonn and we are going to stay involved diplomatically.

And we will consider what, if any, role we could usefully take within

the context of an international security force, keeping in mind

again that the bulk of the security effort will have to be Afghan

and that this force is essentially a gap-filler.

So I would say that is quite a sizable role, Senator. But at the

risk of sounding contradictory, it is sizable, yet still limited. I think

that is the constant challenge here, to avoid doing too little and too much.

Senator Hagel, Iran, as you know, is one of

the six bordering countries on Afghanistan. It has played a large

role in several areas of this, of this question. One is diplomatic. It

is a member of the so-called Six Plus Two Group, which is the

United States, Russia, and the six immediate neighbors. We had

several meetings in New York of this group quite recently.

Iran was one of the countries that sent observers to Bonn, was

one of the countries that worked behind the scene. We have also

exchanged messages through the Swiss with the Iranians about steps that they could take.

I would simply say that by and large the Iranian role diplomatically

has been quite constructive, that they have a lot of influence

with the Northern Alliance or United Front and to the best of our

knowledge they have used that influence constructively in trying to

bring about the sort of compromise that we saw at Bonn.

Second, as Christina referenced, the Iranians have helped in the

humanitarian area. They are host to an awful lot of refugees. They

have facilitated humanitarian assistance. As I think Secretary of

State Powell has mentioned, the Iranians have suggested their

willingness to help if, for example, U.S. pilots ever got into trouble over their territory.

So I am not saying we see everything eye to eye here. On the

other hand, I do think the pattern of Iranian behavior here I think

deserves to be labeled constructive.

Senator, I just spent a few days in Moscow

this past week consulting with the Russians about their role in Afghanistan.

I would say diplomatically that for the most part we are

pulling in the same direction. It was not always agreement on some

of the tactics, about the role, say, of some of the individuals or

groups. But again, I think the bottom line was good and the goals

that we set out, that Assistant Secretary Rocca articulated, about

what it is we all want in Afghanistan, those are shared.

They too, from what we can see, have used their influence behind

the scenes both at Bonn and elsewhere to help. So, while we have

not always agreed 100 percent on every tactic, again I think it is

impressive. It is yet another reminder that the cold war is quite

distant, that the United States and Russia have found ways to cooperate

when their strategic interests are essentially aligned.

I think the Russians also want to demonstrate through their

modest troop presence in Kabul that they still have a special role

there, that they still have some influence there. But I would not

see it as much more than that. I do not see it as a threat or something

to the natural evolution of a more positive security situation there.

Senator, I just do not know all the details,

the tick-tock of exactly what happened just before the Russian

troops arrived. If you would like, I can look into that and get back

to you on that. Well, based on what we know, there are

clearly Chechens in Afghanistan and there are al-Qaeda in

Chechnya. Whether that was specifically part of the Russian function,

I have seen no evidence linking that, because, as Assistant

Secretary Rocca said, the rationale that we have seen was totally

related to the humanitarian.

I have seen no behavior that would suggest,

for example, in order to have determined, for example, that there

were Chechens there, it would have required a different sort of behavior than we have seen.

I would not make much of it. The Chinese

played an active role in the Six Plus Two. They have also got a lot

of influence through the U.N. Security Council. They obviously also

consult particularly closely with the Pakistanis, who were in Bonn.

So I would not make anything of it.

I think for the Chinese the interests are not

simply about Afghanistan, I agree entirely with what Assistant

Secretary Rocca said, but it is also about what this means for the

U.S.-Chinese relationship. We have had consultations with the Foreign

Minister and others since September 11 and the President

was in Shanghai subsequent to September 11, and essentially looking

at ways in which counterterrorism cooperation could potentially increase.

I think the Chinese are essentially, like a lot of other countries,

trying to figure out what this means, not simply what we are doing

in Afghanistan, but what we might do beyond that, and what that

might mean from their national interests as they see them. I think

that, if you will, along with the narrow consideration of Afghanistan—

I think they are really looking at where American foreign

policy is going and again what consequences it might have for China.

Do you want us to remain or do you want to go to your second panel?

We are at your mercy, sir.

Senator Biden, I just returned yesterday

from India, but en route there my first stop was in Berlin, where

I had consultations with the German Government last week about

this and other questions relating to Afghanistan. You are right,

there has been a lot of debate. I think there are people within the

German Government who look favorably on the possibility of their contributing forces.

At least to me, I did not pick up any sense that they were miffed.

When the question was up, I simply said our thinking has not

reached the point of determining exactly what we think is going to

be necessary in terms of size, composition, mandate, and the like.

We first needed an Afghan partner to work with.

But we have made it clear, in answer to your second question as

well, to lots of countries that we welcome our allies——

It is a different situation, though. The situation

on the ground has obviously progressed far. But more important,

politically we do not have the luxury now of simply thinking

about prosecuting the war, though that is our priority. We also are

looking toward the future, and we want to set up a pattern of relationship

with the Afghans where, among other things, an international

security force is not resisted, it is not seen as a hostile

force, where they cooperate with us on facilitating humanitarian

supplies reaching people, where the reconstruction effort does not

waste money and essentially lubricates our efforts to keep national

consensus and keep a modicum of stability.

So I think at this point it is important to work with the Afghans

because we do not want, now that they themselves see that they

have largely, with the coalition’s help, rid themselves of the

Taliban and the large foreign dimension of the Taliban, we do not

want Afghan nationalism in any way to literally or figuratively

train its guns on the United States or any other member of the international community.

Just very quickly to answer, complete the answer on the other

part of it, we have made it clear all along that we look forward to

military contributions to the coalition as this process evolves. The

countries you are talking about—Germany, France, Britain, Turkey—

these are exactly the kinds of countries who would clearly

have the capacity and may well have the willingness to contribute

capable forces to an international security force.

Again, I have not detected that people are miffed for the most

part. It is just simply that we could not get ahead of ourselves with

that force, given the situation on the ground and the evolution of the political situation.

Could I say one thing on that, Senator? I do

not think anyone what watched what the U.S. team at Bonn led

by Jim Dobbins did would describe it as passive.

I agree. But it is our goal that the bulk of

that security function as soon as possible be carried out by Afghans themselves.

Thank you, sir.